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JESUIT TEACHING

ON THE

TEN COMMANDMENTS

BY

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## PREFACE.

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The quotations in this treatise are taken from the principal Jesuit writers, extending over 250 years, from Layman, who published his first work in 1625, to Gury, S.J. (1875), Professor of Moral Theology in the College Romain, the Jesuit College in Rome. Amongst the twenty authors quoted are the famous Busembaum, whose works have been reproduced over 200 times; Liguori, the highest authority in the Church of Rome; Stattler, Filliutius, Castropalos, and other great Jesuit writers. Where the authority is not given, the reader is to attribute the quotation to Gury.

J. B. H.

OTTAWA, 1890.

**First Commandment.**—"I am the Lord thy God ; thou shalt have no other Gods before Me."

The trivial, childish comments of the Jesuits on the Commandments, and the abominable doctrines taught in their exegesis, will deeply impress every reader.

"It is superstitious," says Gury, "to address prayers to St. Bridget or others, and expect from them an *infallible* effect. Notwithstanding, we must not blame, but *praise* those who *wear medals, pious images, or relics, with the hope of receiving divine help.*"

"Is it possible to foretell the future by dreams?"

Answer—"No, *generally* . . . because the dreams sent by God are very rare, and present signs easily distinguished from natural dreams or diabolical ones."

"Is it permitted to use the divining rod?"

Answer—"We must not quite condemn that means of discovering water and metals, provided the rod should move equally if we search for them or not; but we protest against any diabolical intervention!"

In charity, we would infer that Gury means that he protests against the belief of diabolical influences in such cases, if we did not find so many proofs to

the contrary in his works. "We cannot refuse," he says in another place, "to have faith in all the diabolical facts of this nature."

"What must we think of such practices as table-turning, etc.?"

Answer—"We must attribute to the devil everything that is done in the form of divination. Who would dare to affirm that it is God or an angel sent by him who intervenes? It could not be from souls expiating in Purgatory that we can expect the knowledge of sacred things. Of course, it is the devil himself who is invoked—it is he who is worshipped!"

"Sacrilege is:—1st, personal; 2nd, local; 3rd, real.

"A personal sacrilege is committed:—1st, in laying violent hands on one of the clergy or on a monk; 2nd, in luxuriously violating persons devoted to God, even by simple sensual contact; 3rd, in traducing ecclesiastics before a tribunal." The Roman Church teaches that civil governments have no right to adjudicate on any matters concerning their clergy.

The teaching of the Jesuits would not be complete on any doctrine, not even on any one of the Commandments, without some lascivious, offensive illustrations. Hence we have these examples given under the Commandment, "*Thou shalt have no other Gods before Me*," some of the expressions in which I must leave in Latin.

St. Liguori, the greatest authority in the Roman Church, says: "If a priest, in administering sacraments or in the act of saying Mass, when clothed in sacred vestments, or leaving the altar, pollutes himself voluntarily or delights in venereal pleasure, he commits a sacrilege." (Book 3, No. 363.)

With a little imagination, tainted with Jesuit theology, one could invent a triple sacrilege—not, perhaps, very savoury. These pious fathers could not touch any subject without giving examples offensive through and through. Here is one taken from Gury's exposition of the First Commandment: "Renatus went to Church to meet his betrothed. He allowed his mind to be filled with depraved thoughts, and did nothing else but *de se toucher et polluer* (some of these sentences I must leave untranslated). The Mass being over, he invited the young girl by signs to abandon herself to him (*copulam habendam*) in some other place." (Gury on the First Commandment.) The comments of the Jesuit father on this example are too objectionable for reproduction.

*The Second Commandment is omitted by Jesuit commentators.*

**Third Commandment (second precept of the Jesuits).—**"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain."—Ex., xx., 7.

An oath is an invocation of the Divine Name to attest the truth.

"One is not bound by an oath given in a promise of marriage to a young lady, rich, healthy, a virgin, and of good reputation, if she falls into poverty, sickness, infamy, or fornication. Surely these misfortunes must release a man, because a simple promise does not oblige in this case." (Gury.)

"The promissory oath does not oblige: 1st, when it cannot be kept without incurring grave damages, &c." (Marotte.) Such doctrines find no sanction from the Scriptures or the conscience of an honourable man.

"What are the signs of a true possession by the devil?"

Answer—"The principal are: 1st, speaking a language not known before; 2nd, divulging secret and strange things; 3rd, obeying the purely internal orders of the priest; 4th, experiencing greater suffering or greater tranquillity by the devil when ignorantly touching sacred things."

"Is one held by a vow if he doubts that he has pronounced a vow or only a simple proposition; or that there has been sufficient deliberation?"

Answer—"No; but if, when pronouncing, he

believed that it would be a sin not to fulfil the vow, the vow is valid." Divine and human laws, and not vows and oaths, settle our obligations to God and man. In our relation with our fellow beings our promises are binding—our vows and oaths do not add to their force.

"Is a vow valid if it has a perverse aim or evil conditions?"

Answer—1, "No, if the bad aim is attached to the vow; for instance, if you vow to give alms in order to steal successfully."

Answer—2, "Yes, if, when the vow is made, one is influenced by good sentiments. It is valid, then, though having a bad cause or evil conditions. For instance: To vow to give alms if one is not caught stealing; because, if to steal is an evil, not to steal is not one, but certainly a gift of God. That is: God protects the thief who steals to be able to give alms." "Now," Gury continues, "the vow does not bear upon evil, but on good, insomuch it is good by itself."

The Jesuit's exegesis on every precept of the decalogue ends with illustrations "offensive through and through," as the Parliament of France, the oldest son of the Church, designated, in 1760, their teaching in all the authors laid before them. I take from Gury the following:—



**"Cases on the Second Precept (Third Commandment) of the Decalogue."**

"Gervais, a youth, vowed: 1st, to preserve a perpetual chastity; 2nd, not to eat the heads of animals, in honour of St. John the Baptist, the beheaded."

"Are these vows valid?"

Answer—"Yes, for the first; no, for the second."

Unquestionably neither of these vows could create any obligation. Gervais might, from choice, live in perpetual celibacy, and refuse to eat the heads of animals, but his vows could not bind him.

"Veronica, observing that her daughter Martine is pregnant by Titus, vows before God and the Virgin to give a hundred pieces of gold to the Church if her daughter dies before giving birth to a child.

"Is the vow valid?"

Answer—"Though valid as to the object of the vow, it is illicit as to the end; indeed, though one cannot condemn (?) a mother who, to avoid dishonour, wishes for God to take away her daughter. However, as there is an eternal injury for the child, and as the desire of the mother is not subject to the condition of her eternal salvation, but is absolute, that desire is illicit."

Whence comes the mother's right to wish and pray for her daughter's death?



**Fourth Commandment (3rd precept in the Decalogue of the Jesuits).—"Remember the Sabbath Day to keep it Holy."**

"It is permitted to write on a feast day, because it is a liberal art; also to draw, to copy music, to correct books, because they are liberal arts." One might admit the innocence of these acts, but where does Gury get his authority? his reasons are trivial. "It is not permitted to sculpture, because sculpturing is generally classified as a mechanical art; of painting there is controversy (different opinions.) Fishing and hunting are permitted, because they are not manual works, provided no great noise, bustle and great preparations are made. In a purely manual work, two hours are sufficient and allowable; if scarcely manual, three hours." (*Gury.*)

**Fifth Commandment (The fourth precept in the Decalogue of the Jesuits).—"Honour thy father and thy mother."**

We must recognise that in Gury, no trace is found of the infamous doctrine taught by Escabor in the following terms: "A son is not obliged to feed an infidel father who is in the greatest necessity, if the father tries to induce him to abandon his faith."

"He is absolutely obliged to it."

"He is not at all obliged to it."

"This last sentiment must be held absolutely, be-

cause catholic children are obliged to denounce their fathers and relations guilty of heresy—even should they know that their fathers ought to be delivered to the flames according to the teachings of Tolet—then they may refuse them nourishment and even let them die.” Fagundez adds, “that they may even kill them, keeping, however, the moderation proper to legitimate defence.”

**Sixth Commandment: “Thou shall do no Murder.”—(Gury’s fifth precept of the Decalogue of the Jesuits.—“Thou shalt not kill.”)**

The Jesuit Herreau dictated the following precept to his pupils at the college in Paris, in 1641. “If any one, by a false accusation, should calumniate me, and I can maintain my good name in no other way, I should be justified in assassinating him ; I should also be justified, had the crime of which I was accused been committed.” Father Escabor, in his philosophy, taught, “that it is quite allowable to kill one who bears false witness against you, if such act compromises your life or *your honour*.” “It may be done also if the false witness has temporal good in view” (p. 416). One may secretly kill a calumniator, if there are no other means of warding off the peril.” (p. 419). Fathers Busembaum, Lamy, Henrique, the great Stattler, and others, express themselves more clearly to the same effect. Father Henrique

(*summa Theologiæ morales*) says, "if an ecclesiastic, caught in adultery by the husband of the woman, kills the man to defend his own life and honour, he is not only quite justified, but is not incapacitated from exercising his ecclesiastical functions." The famous Father Sanchez coolly asserts "it is allowable to murder any one who advances an unjust accusation, or bears false witness against us." Parson Reimbauer adduced Stattlers' christian moral philosophy as a justification, when he murdered Anna Eichslatter in cold blood, because she threatened (only threatened) to make certain revelations about him. Surely the doctrine taught in this and other quotations is, "that the end justifies the means." Busembaum adds: "Every time someone has the right to kill another, someone else can do it for him or in his place, seeing that charity allows it." (p. 441)

"Is it allowable to kill a tyrant? Upon the whole, no." On this question, Gury teaches a doctrine different from the older Jesuits, who had no doubt as to the legitimacy of killing a tyrant and Sovereigns opposed to them. In theory, the Jesuits may appear to have changed, but practically sustain their former teachings, carried into effect in the murder of Henry III. and Henry IV. of France, of Clement XIV., and the attempt on the life of Queen Elizabeth. The praise bestowed on Jaques Clement for the murder of Henry III., showed that they approved of

the deed. "Is it permitted to kill an unjust aggressor for the preservation of one's limbs? Yes, according to the common opinion." Penal laws are more severe. What frightful consequences Jesuits have drawn from this dangerous teaching! Father Henrique asserts that, "if an adulterer, even a priest, well aware of the danger, has called at the adulteress' house, and, surprised by the husband, kills the latter to save his own life and limbs, it does not seem that he incurs irregularity." (p. 396.)

"Is it permitted to kill one who steals considerable property if there is no other way of keeping it?"

Answer—"Yes; at least, more probably." The Jesuit doctrine of probabilism means that when a priest gives several opinions, each one of which is said to be probable, a person may adopt any of them, even the least probable. But the Jesuits have a sliding scale: one may kill a thief for taking "considerable property." How much is "considerable," and what is to be done to the thief who steals less than "considerable?" Most Jesuits take refuge in vaguely formed statements. De Lugo, a cardinal, thinks the sum should be at least a ducat, and that there should be no violence. (p. 422.) "The thief should be allowed to go unpunished," for the Jesuits always take the part of the culprit. Marotte does not hesitate to teach children in his *petit Catéchisme* this Jesuitical doctrine, nor would the pious fathers be consistent if

they were not to illustrate every precept by obscene examples.

"Is a woman permitted to kill one who makes an attempt on her modesty? Yes, according to the more probable opinion. A young girl is not permitted to kill, after the crime, the one who attempted to destroy her honour." Extraordinary doctrine! A woman may kill a man who attempts the crime, but must not kill him after he *commits* it! "She may, however, strike him and treat him with the greatest harshness!"

"Is it allowable, for a grave reason, to do an action good in itself, from which, against our intention, results the death of an innocent person?" The question is framed in such a manner that the person doing the act leading to the death of others foresees the fatal result, but does nothing to prevent it. The answer given to this question is: "One is not guilty of homicide when one does an action not causing death by itself, but from which results homicide *by accident*." Marotte, in his *petit Catéchisme*, teaches children that murder is justifiable when "One, in a grave and urgent case, does an action good in itself, although liable to cause the death of one or several innocent persons, provided the one who does the action should have nothing else in view than the good which will result from it, and does what is possible to remove the bad effect dreaded."

“ Could Eulalie (a Virgin just named) throw herself through a high window to escape violence and preserve her virginity? 1st, No, in principle, except in case of celestial inspiration.” How is she to know that she is inspired? “ 2nd, Yes, because death, although the consequence of the fall, was not desired.”

“ Gaspard, a physician, avows to his confessor that to a pregnant woman on the point of death he gave a remedy that was a sure cure, foreseeing that the fœtus would perish. Question—What is to be thought of Gaspard? Answer—He is not reprehensible.”

**Seventh and Tenth Commandments.—“ Thou shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s wife.” (Gury’s sixth and ninth precepts.)**

The teaching and illustrations of the Jesuits on these Commandments are so entirely and inexcusably offensive, that they cannot be produced for the public. I say “inexcusably offensive,” because no good, in the interest of morality, can possibly be served by the disgusting details entered into by the Jesuit fathers in treating this delicate subject. Lust, carnal pleasures (*delectatie venera*), consummated and unconsummated, rape, fornication, adultery, incest, defloration, ravishment, sodomy, bestiality, Onanism, etc., are minutely described.



How priests are to be judged who have committed the prohibited act but once, twice or three times, or who commit the crime of bestiality. These offences, in all their conceivable and inconceivable forms and species, are illustrated with painstaking minutiae, under the plea that the priests must give directions in the secret confessionals to men and women, even to young boys and girls, on these Commandments. And as if this were not enough, they multiply instructions on viewing, touching, feeling, kissing, embracing, contemplating every part of the body. We cannot, at the same time, but remember how the Jesuits, while condemning lustful sins with indignation and simulated chaste horror, have found practical accommodations and excuses for the violation of these as of every other precept of Holy Writ.

**Eighth Commandment** "Thou shalt not steal." (Gury's 7th and 8th precepts of the Decalogue).

"When is there a grave matter in theft?"

Answer—"It cannot be determined;" the very terms of the question imply that there is theft which is not grave.

Answer 2.—"In order that theft should be looked upon as grave relatively, it must be of the value: 1st, of one franc for the poor, and a little less for the very poor; 2nd, about two or three francs for

workmen who live day by day ; 3rd, about three or four francs for moderately rich people ; 4th, about six or seven francs for rich people.”—(*Gury.*)

“In order that the matter should be absolutely grave, two or three pieces of gold, to the value of one dollar each, are necessary.”—(*Gury.*) The Jesuits have always taught that there are degrees of criminality in theft, not according to the circumstance, as in civil laws, but according to the amount of the sum stolen, and the position of the victim. This is the teaching of Tolet, Navarre, Sotus, Gordon, etc., naming only the most eminent. This doctrine leads to very curious consequences. Vasquez says, “that the theft of thirty pieces of gold is a greater sin than sodomy ;” and Guimenius explains very learnedly that “the gravest sin is the one which violates the gravest virtue ; now, theft is contrary to justice, one of the greatest virtues ; the sodomy of chastity being least, it follows, etc.” (p. 365.) Marotte, in his *Petit Catéchisme*, asks and answers such questions as these, “What is the quantity required in theft, for a mortal sin ?

Answer—“This depends not only on the stolen object, but also on the condition and need of the thief’s victim, on the damage suffered by that person, etc. ; a theft of ten francs’ value from the richest is a mortal sin, but to a workman, a theft of one, two, three, four or five francs is always a mortal sin.” The doctrine taught here to children, is that less

than these sums might not be a sin. Marotte continues, "can several little thefts constitute a mortal sin? Yes, when these little thefts are morally united and a notable damage results from them." But, of course, the little thefts not *morally* united, and not resulting in notable damage, would not be a mortal sin, and might not be a sin at all! By such precepts as the following do Jesuits enter into the privacy of families, and corrupt wives, children, and servants. (*Gury.*)

"It is admitted by everybody (?) that more is necessary to establish a grave theft by wives, children, and servants than by strangers. More probably the sum must be double!" Theft, therefore, is not theft—is not a crime in itself. "According to many authors, small thefts of food or beverage never become notable sins." Here the quality and nature of the things stolen settle questions of criminality or innocence.

"Small thefts united to form a whole, if they are separated by long intervals of time, are not grave matters according to common opinion, because after a certain lapse of time small thefts are not supposed to unite, and so do not constitute a common object in morality." How long a time would it take, according to this teaching, for the greatest sins to lose their criminality. A murderer, by evading trial, might, in time, become innocent. But "no more than two months, according to the

probable opinion, ought to elapse between the thefts, or one year, according to others ! ”

“ When small thefts take place at different intervals, to the prejudice of the *same persons*, the matter will be grave if they constitute half the sum necessary for a mortal sin. If they take place to the prejudice of *several*, there is a grave matter when the stolen sum is twice as large. It is questionable whether it is a grave sin to steal small objects after having committed a theft liable to be considered grave ! ”

“ If several persons, without agreeing, commit slight thefts, constituting a great totality, each one does not sin gravely.” Laymann says : “ If you steal from each one of thirty merchants a small quantity, it may happen that you do not sin mortally, because you are not doing considerable harm to any of them.”

2. “ If you steal from one or several persons at long intervals of times, a greater quantity is necessary to constitute a mortal sin. So, when a servant steals, each time one cent, which amounts after four years, to a golden ducat, [pause, reader, to think of the standard] I do not think one must be looked upon as guilty of a mortal sin.”

3. “ If you steal to-day, six cents from Caius, from whom you have stolen several times, but to whom you have made restitution, the last six cents have no relation to the first, and do not constitute a mortal sin.

4. "When several persons commit several thefts from some one, which, taken together, do him considerable wrong, then if each thief is ignorant of the theft of the others, no one sins grievously." Laymann gives many more similar trivial illustrations, in teaching these demoralizing doctrines.

*On causes excusing thefts.*—"There are two: 1, Necessity; 2, Occult [secret] compensation. A man can in extreme need use the property of others, because there are here no natural rights! In this case, everything becomes common; and the one who takes the property of another in a case of need, takes the common property (as it existed) before the division of property, then he does not commit any theft. According to the common opinion, a person may take the property of another, not only to help himself, but others, because he substitutes himself for the indigent, and shows that he loves his neighbour as himself."

"In case of extreme need, or nearly so, can we steal an object of value, as a large sum? Yes, according to the more common opinion, provided the rich one is not brought by that theft to an equal needful situation, and the poor one takes only what he needs."

These are very old teachings of the Jesuits.

Pierre Alagon (1620) says, "one is permitted on account of need, to steal either secretly or openly; if he has no other means of providing for himself, it

is neither theft nor rapine, because then (when one is in want) according to the natural right everything is in common. A third person is also permitted, furtively, to take property and give it to some needful person." (p. 357.) Busembaum is clearer, "One," he says, "who is very poor may take what is necessary for his maintenance, etc., and what a man can do for himself, he can do for another who is in extreme poverty."

De Coninch, Lessius, De Castelle, Tambourin and Marotte, add, that a poor man could even kill one who would prevent him from taking the thing needful to him.

"Secret compensation consists in recovering a thing belonging to us by taking some thing which is not ours."

Like most definitions of the Jesuits, this, on secret compensation, is so framed, as to cover and justify the false teaching which follows. "The thing belonging to us" here referred to is the imaginary wage which the servant, judging his own case, thinks he should receive over and above that he agreed to work for. "Secret compensation may be just and permissible, if it presents the required conditions: 1, That the debt is certain; 2, That it cannot be recovered in any other way; 3, That the thing taken must be natural property; 4, That the debtor is not obliged to pay twice; 5, One must take nothing more than what is owed him."—(*Gury*).



Tolet said, (in 1864), "that when a person takes from his debtor the sum owed him, he does not steal." De Lugo says, "if I know that you are not disposed to pay me in one month, I can take what belongs to me. If I know that you are to come to me to-morrow to steal one hundred pounds from me, who can say that I cannot take as much from you to-day?" "From this we conclude," says De Lugo, "that if the Judge questions, and even exacts, an oath from one who "compensates himself," he can deny." (p. 361). Fernand Revelle says, "If a salary was due to a servant, according to the common estimation, larger than he agreed for, he can subtract secretly, and without scandal, the surplus."

The Jesuits had once to repent of their teachings. In 1647, Jean d'Allea, a servant, stole from them, pretending that they owed him thirty pounds. "He argued before the court that from the teachings of his masters, a person could pay himself for his wages, and the Judge set him at liberty." (p. 360.) After Innocent XI. condemned this teaching, the Jesuits began to cavil and explain away the Papal condemnation. De Cardenas, a great authority, says: "The sovereign Pontiff does not speak of the case in which it is as clear as daylight that masters commit an injustice by diminishing the salary or not paying the price agreed upon. In such cases servants can use secret compensation." (p. 366.) And Taberna, while bowing to the Papal

decision, does not hesitate to write that "The one who judges he is not paid enough may compensate himself secretly." (p. 374.)

Gury teaches that "We can have recourse to secret compensation if we are condemned by judgment to pay a debt which we have not contracted or have paid, because the judgment is unjust!" This may be an injustice, but under civil law we are not allowed to take the remedy into our own hands. Ecclesiastical law, which ought to be more strict, reaching even the motives of men, is, according to Jesuit interpretation, much more elastic. Gury adds that "It is not a grave sin, and against justice, to compensate oneself without first having recourse to the Judge. . . . In general there is no grave sin in this; there is no sin if it is difficult to have recourse to the Judge."

**Ninth Commandment.**—"Thou shalt not bear false witness."—Ex. xx., 16. (Gury's eighth precept of the Decalogue.)

"It is allowable to take a false oath without having the intention of keeping it." (*Father de Cardinas.*) "To make use of words of double meaning and to falsely deceive the judge is allowable in certain cases. (*The great Jesuit Author Castropalos.*) "To this view," he adds, "our most learned theologians agree, Navarre, Tolet, Suarez, Valencia, and Lassius," all Jesuits.

Gury says: "A culprit interrogated judicially or not lawfully by the judge may answer that he has done nothing, meaning about which you, the judge, have a right to question me," or "that I am obliged to avow."

"Anyone not legitimately interrogated may answer that he does not know anything about what is asked, understanding mentally in such a manner that he is obliged to tell." (p. 295.) This is Emanuel Sa's formula, 1640.

This doctrine, taught from the origin of the Society three and a-half centuries ago, is accepted to this day, and acted upon by the Jesuit clergy in their intercourse and dealings with society. A proof of this is given in an incident which occurred in the police (French) court of St. Julien, reported by the local paper, *Patriote Savoisien*, 1879.

"Bad faith, lies, concealments of all kinds have not been lacking to the culprit and professors of the school called as witnesses;" and if so boldly proclaimed under the solemnity of oaths in a court of justice, what must these "lies and concealments" have been in the daily routine of the school?

"At the beginning of the examination of a young priest," the report continues, "the President of the court recalled to him the importance of the oath on account of his sacerdotal character.

"The reserved bearing of the witness (a priest), his efforts to escape the incisive and precise ques-

tions of the magistrate, brought him this sharp and witty reprimand :

“‘I was not wrong, sir, to recall to you the importance of your oath. I see, with grief, that your calculated concealments show me that I was entirely right.’

“The attorney of the Republic, in his turn, did not fear to tell the culprit, ‘as a magistrate, I am indignant at your attitude—as a *Catholic*, I am ashamed of it.’ These words, from a good communicant *Catholic*, have a significance understood by everybody.” The priest was acting on what he had learned from Gury. The judge had no right, according to the Jesuit teaching, to question a priest, and the priest could answer whatever he liked, even under oath. “A priest cannot be obliged to bear witness before a secular magistrate.” (*Taberna.*) “A priest may swear equivocally before a secular judge that he has not committed the offence, because the judge is incompetent towards ecclesiastics.” (*Tambourin.*) “The witness and culprit are not obliged to answer according to the judge’s intention.” (*Fagundez. p. 315.*)

“If you have killed Peter in self-defence, you can swear before the judge that you did not kill (restricting your meaning to the word) ‘unjustly.’”

“In the same way when you use false weights secretly, you can, in the presence of the judge, *deny under oath*, that you have been using false weights

(adding mentally) "from which the buyer has unjustly suffered."—(*Georges Gobet*, 1701.) p. 322.

"There is no proposition in whatever large spirit it is taken which is not susceptible of some mental restriction." (p. 313. *F. de Castro Palao*.) That is, one is justified in perverting every statement so as to make it appear the reverse of the fact.

"If someone asks me if I have killed Caius, I answer, I have not killed him; though I did kill him, I do not lie, I do not sin." (p. 339.)—*Busembaum*.

"Now," says Ch. Ant. Casnedi, I am going to examine a new manner of telling no lies while hiding the truth; and this not by shutting one's mouth but by speaking." The explaining of the new manner of telling no lies when really telling them, is too long for repetition here, but the very attempt to do this is truly Jesuitical, and is another example of the puerilities in which the casuists indulge. "The one who swears materially," he says, "does not swear, because, in order to swear the use of the words 'I swear' is necessary: then, the one who uses the words 'I swear,' as not being significant, does not swear." (p. 327.)

Gury gives the example, (I quote the words.) "Anna, guilty of adultery, answered her husband at first that she had not broken the marriage vow. Thus, having received absolution for her sins. answered, 'I am innocent of such a crime.' A third time, to the entreaties of her husband, she absolutely

denied the fault. In the three cases, "Anna," says Gury, "may be excused from any lie, because, in the first case she could say she had not broken the marriage vow, it being existent still. (The word 'broken' being here used in two different senses.) In the second case, having received absolution, her conscience is at rest. She could affirm it under oath, according to Liguori, the greatest authority in the Church of Rome. In the third case, she could deny her sin, meaning in such a way that she was not obliged to reveal it to her husband." This is almost as good as the case of Fegeli. "A man being asked if a thief has passed that way, can answer, *lawfully*, putting his foot upon the paving stone, *he did not pass this way*, meaning on the paving stone."

Father Benedict Stattler, in his celebrated work, "Allgemeine Katholisch Christliche Sittenlehre (Munich, 1790, vol. I.), says: "It is still more allowable to bring the calumniator to universal notice by a disclosure of his secret transgressions or crimes; also to attribute a false crime to the calumniator is allowable for such object. If this should be the only sufficient, indispensable, or even serviceable means to deprive him of all belief and credit for his calumnation." Tamburin, in his decalogue (lib. 9, ch. 2, sec. 2) recommends "reprisals against anyone by whom one may have been insulted, not merely by means of judicial complaints,



but by retaliation, and, before everything, by detraction and calumny, to deprive such persons of honour and good repute. A number of people will soon be found who will swear to the calumny brought against your accuser, as naturally men have much desire for wickedness, and thus the person insulting you falls into greater disgrace, until at length everyone points a finger at him."

Hermann Busembaum, one of the earliest and most noted Jesuit fathers, and the first to teach the doctrine in his *medulla*, "*cum finis est licitus, etiam media sunt licita*" (p. 320, Frankfort, 1653): "When the end is allowable or justifiable, the means are also allowable," says, in his *Christian Theology*, Book III., part VI., ch. I., that: "In the case of anyone unjustifiably making an attack on your honour, when you cannot otherwise defend yourself than by impeaching the integrity of the person insulting you, it is quite allowable to do so." And this from one of the most distinguished and trusted theologians of the Jesuits, whose morality has been so highly prized, that his works have gone through more than two hundred editions since 1653 and been recently stamped with the authority of the Papal sanction. Busembaum proceeds to give a kind of sliding scale of immorality (or morality, as the Jesuits would call it) in the retaliation. "No greater insult," he teaches, "must be inflicted on the person than has befallen yourself, an exact

comparison being made between your own worth and that of the insulter." If, he seems to mean, the insulted person (say a Jesuit priest) has a standing, for instance, ten times higher than the insulter, the latter should be slandered ten times more than he slandered the priest; and if the insulted should be the General of the Order, there would seem to be no limits within measurable bounds of the amount of abuse which could justifiably be heaped upon the offender. It would be simply a big scolding match.

Leonard Lassius expresses himself more freely (Lib. II., De Anst, cap. 2). "Has anyone," he writes, "made an attack on your honour, you may then at once make use of retaliation, and you have thereby nothing else to observe than to keep up a comparison as much as possible."

The examples of Jesuit doctrine which are given in these pages, are the merest A B C of their teaching in their boasted schools, and in the confessional.

Pause, reader, for a moment, and imagine boys or girls placed in the tender years of childhood, under the care of such teachers, as are here even imperfectly described and carried through the entire course of instruction, until they come from Jesuit mouldings, finished casuists, *Jesuit* casuists, and ask yourself what the character of such products would be, trained in these infernal doctrines. Could an imp of the father of lies, suddenly clothed in human flesh,

polished, active, adroit, commissioned to confess, to absolve, be more dangerous in our families !

Young woman, first, for your danger is greatest : father, mother, wife, husband, children, brother, sister, friend in business, in pleasure, in sport ; judge, juror, witness, counsel, be on your guard against such persons, and against each other if members of the order of Jesus, for, without country, kindred, or family, acknowledging no relationship, bound by no ties, they may, in the apparently dearest intercourse of social life, plot without remorse, without sin, to injure, to ruin you. Husband, mistrust your wife, for there are feminine Jesuits, and more than ever, when she resorts to the confessional, for she can, without sin, steal your property for herself, her Order, or for her friends, especially if she suspects that you may not leave it to her. Wife, mistrust your husband ; young woman, mistrust your betrothed, for, while pledging his word under the most sacred vows to marry you, he may whisper to himself that he does not mean it, and will feel bound by his secret, rather than by his public declaration. Father, distrust your Jesuit son, who may, without sin or remorse, give you to be burned for heresy, or, if this be impossible in a Protestant land, may steal your possessions for his own or his Order's benefit. If on your death-bed you charge him with a legacy to a friend, he can in accordance with Jesuit doctrine, disregard your last wish. If, as a servant, he can persuade himself

that you are in his debt, he can secretly compensate himself; if you trust him with money, he may without sin defraud you, trade with it and keep the profits. As a servant, he knows the Jesuit theory of petty thefts and secret compensations, which he is taught to call "establishing an equilibrium."

Before a judge, under the most solemn oath, he justifies himself in giving false evidence, and even if a priest he can do this, having been taught that a judge has no right to question him. Avoid him as one infected with the plague, as neither your property, your life, nor your honour is safe near him. He may instigate a thief to plunder you, or may receive money from him to keep his crime a secret. As a judge he may receive money for rendering an unjust judgment. He may burn down your house while trying to rob you, and not be responsible for it. He may assassinate your husband or child, and owe you nothing; or he may assassinate your father in his attempt to kill another, and still be innocent. He may betray a woman under promise of marriage, and then desert her; should she lose her fortune he may break his promise of marriage, and equally so if she fail in health or meet with any misfortune. Even after the ceremony has been performed, he may annul the marriage under the plea that he had uttered a secret vow at the time that he did not mean to marry. By mental reservations and equivocal words he can violate every

obligation; under the doctrine of probabilism, interpreted by a priest of easy faith, he can do anything which he conceives to be for his interest, and by virtue of the doctrine of intention he may violate all laws, human or divine. For him there is, in truth, no law, no obligation, no duty to God or man which he cannot evade.

Are we not, then, justly alarmed, when these men, driven like dogs out of every country professing the Papal religion, now fasten themselves upon this young Dominion, obtain an act of incorporation denied them in Great Britain and in Romanist countries, and receive an endowment from the public exchequer? Can we help being filled with horror when we consider that the youth of the land are, at tender years, to be committed to such teachers of iniquity, corrupting the fountains of life and perverting every moral and religious precept!

Hence the uprising of even the people of their own faith against these vaunted fathers as educators, especially when it was found how little of a scientific character was given in their schools, and how perverted, defective, and injurious was their whole system, leaving out of their teaching all the nobler portions, all that might enlighten the understanding, raise the sentiments, or that might in any way lay bare the object of the Jesuits.

We cannot close better than by giving the burning words of the great Strossmayer, bishop of

Bosnia and Servia, addressed to the 767 cardinals, patriarchs, archbishops, and bishops, titular and real, who composed the Ecumenical Council at Rome, in 1869 :—

“Consider well, my honourable brethren,” he exclaimed, “the situation in which these men (the Jesuits) stand. It is they who initiate and determine all the proceedings of the Council. Consider the dangers to which the Church must be subject when it takes its teachings from the Jesuits, as their doctrines are in contradiction to history, to the Fathers of the Church, to the Word of God—to everything, in short, that is held most sacred by true Christians.”





